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Abstract. We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of
poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of ‘multidimensional
poverty line’ and we characterize axiomatically several poverty rankings of opportunity proﬁles.
Among them, the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings, which are the natural
counterparts of the most widely used income poverty indices.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31; D63; I31.
1. Introduction
The present work is devoted to the problem of ranking distributions of individual opportunity
sets in terms of poverty.
Poverty reduction plays a prominent role in political debates in many countries, and methods
and techniques to make poverty comparisons are necessary tools in order to design and to evaluate
policies aimed at decreasing poverty.
Since the publication of Sen’s (1976) pioneering paper on poverty measurement, in the last quarter
century a great deal has been written on this subject and several measures of poverty are now
available in the literature. However, most of the existing literature on poverty measurement regards
income or consumption expenditures as the only relevant explanatory dimensions of poverty. This
approach now appears as inadequate because poverty is essentially a multidimensional phenomenon
and the exclusive reliance on just one indicator can hide crucial aspects of economic deprivation.
Indeed, if we consider for example two societies with the same distribution of monetary earnings,
we can hardly think of them as equivalent in terms of poverty if in one of them a fraction of the
Date: April 8, 2009.
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population is denied a number of basic rights and liberties such as the right to vote, freedom of
speech, freedom of movement and so on. In that connection, many scholars like Rawls (1971), Sen
(1980, 1997), Roemer (1996) have defended in their inﬂuential works the necessity to move from an
income-based evaluation of social inequities towards a more comprehensive domain.
Although the inadequacy of a unidimensional approach to evaluating social inequities is well
recognized, it is nevertheless a common practice of economists to do so. One of the basic reasons for
this is linked to the diﬃculties met in data collection and data analysis. Moreover, in addition to
data limitation and empirical constraints, a multidimensional evaluation of poverty is by no means
straightforward from a theoretical point of view.
T h ef o c u so ft h ep r e s e n tw o r ki s ,i nf a c t ,t h i ss p e c i ﬁc measurement problem. In particular,
we consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunities on the basis of poverty. An
individual’s opportunities are described by a set rather than by a scalar, as it is the case with income
or consumption. As a consequence, the problem becomes that of ranking diﬀerent distributions of
opportunity sets.
To keep the approach as general as possible, the notion of “opportunity” is treated in an abstract
way: we deﬁne an opportunity set as any ﬁnite set in some arbitrary space. Opportunities may
be thought of as non welfare characteristics of agents such as basic liberties, political rights, and
individual freedoms; or as access to certain welfare enhancing traits. A further interpretation is in
terms of functionings à la Sen (such as being educated, being well-nourished, avoiding premature
mortality, and so on): in this case the opportunity set corresponds to the capability set of an
individual.
The present paper is linked to two diﬀerent branches of literature.
On the one hand, it is related to the literature on the measurement of multidimensional poverty
(see, among others, Alkire and Foster (2008), Chakravarty, Mukherjee and Ranade (1998), Bour-
guignon and Chakravarty (1999, 2002), Tsui (2002), ). However, the approach we propose is diﬀerent
and possibly more general with respect to such a literature. Our abstract setting for modeling the
diﬀerent dimensions of individual deprivation relies on a ﬁnite domain as opposed to the domain
considered in the literature on multidimensional poverty indices that is the Cartesian product of
multivariate Euclidean spaces. Moreover, it is a well established result that any multivariate distri-
bution, real-valued or otherwise, typically admits only partial rankings (e.g. dominance orderings)
of the latter as natural and non-controversial. On the contrary, the literature on multidimensional
poverty measurement is concerned with synthetic measures of the degree of poverty among individ-
uals and, in so doing, it reduces all variables we want to compare to scalars. Such an information
loosing exercise is in fact disputable in a multivariate context and is the opposite in spirit to whatPOVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 3
we are going to develop here. Indeed, we propose to characterize poverty rankings that are pre-
orders, rather than controversial total ordering of multidimensional distributions, which rely on
some suitable minimalist requirements.
On the other hand our paper is linked to the literature which focuses on the ranking problems
for diﬀerent distributions of opportunity sets. This problem has been ﬁrst addressed by Kranich
(1996) and Ok (1997), who however focused only on inequality rankings. There is now an extensive
literature concerned with the measurement of inequality of opportunity: see, for example, Arlegi
and Nieto (1999), Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de gaer (1999), Herrero (1997), Herrero, Iturbe-
Ormaetxe, and Nieto (1998), Kranich (1996, 1997), Ok (1997), Ok and Kranich (1998), and Savaglio
and Vannucci (2007). A survey of this literature may be found in Barberà, Bossert and Pattanaik.
(2004).
The issue of ranking diﬀerent distributions of opportunities in terms of the poverty they exhibit
has never been addressed before. The present paper ﬁlls this gap. We address the problem of
ranking proﬁles of opportunity sets on the basis of poverty.
A natural approach towards devising a poverty ranking for opportunity distributions is try and
extend the basic income poverty measures into our richer setting. In this vein, we study alternative
ways of extending the familiar notion of “poverty line” and the most well known poverty measures
in the context of opportunity distributions. In order to identify the diﬀerent value systems involved
in the use of diﬀerent poverty criteria we use the axiomatic metodhology, we propose a number of
properties that a poverty-ranking relation on the possible distributions (proﬁles) of ﬁnite opportu-
nity sets should satisfy, and study their logical implications. We introduce a threshold or minimum
standard for opportunity sets, which mimics the "poverty line" of the unidimensional case, and
characterize two fundamental orderings: the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rank-
ings. Such rankings are the natural counterparts of the most widely used income poverty measures,
namely the head count ratio and the income poverty gap. Indeed, the head-count ranking is pro-
duced by counting the number of population units whose endowments fail to meet the minimum
standard. On the other hand, the opportunity gap ranking is produced by counting the number
of extra-opportunities (or functionings) each population unit should be endowed with in order to
achieve the minimum standard, and by summing them.
In addition, we axiomatically characterize two lexicographic orderings based on the HC and OG
rankings and a third one based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap criteria.
The paper is organized as follow. The next section introduces the analytical setting and deﬁnes
formally the basic problem studied in this paper. Section 3 introduces and discusses a ﬁrst set of
axioms and contains the main results of the paper: the characterization of the Head-Count and the4 VITO PERAGINE
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Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings. Section 4 provides and discusses an additional set of axioms
a i m e da tc h a r a c t e r i z i n gc o m p o s i t er a n k i n g sb a s e do nt h eH Ca n dO G .S e c t i o n5c o n c l u d e sw i t ha
brief discussion of the results and of directions for future research, while an appendix collects all
proofs.
2. The framework
We start by identifying a universal non-empty set of opportunities, denoted by X.W ea s s u m et h a t
each element in X is desirable in some universal sense. Moreover, following the existing literature,
we assume that opportunities are nonrival, so that a given opportunity is potentially available to
everyone simultaneously, and that opportunities are excludable, so that providing an opportunity
to some individuals does not necessarily imply that everyone has this opportunity.
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the ﬁnite set of relevant population units and P[X] the set of all ﬁnite
subsets of X. Elements of P[X] are referred to as opportunity sets, and mappings Y =( Y1,...,Yn) ∈
P[X]N as proﬁles of opportunity sets, or simply opportunity proﬁles.
Hence, each individual in a society is endowed with an opportunity set and a society is represented
by an opportunity proﬁles. We are interested in ranking such opportunity proﬁles in terms of
poverty.1
Following Sen’s approach, the evaluation of poverty can be divided into two steps: (i) the identi-
ﬁcation step, in which the poor are identiﬁed in a given society; (ii) the aggregation step, in which
the characteristics of the poor are aggregated in order to obtain an assessment of the poverty in a
society.
As for the identiﬁcation step, in the unidimensional context an income poverty line is chosen that
divides the population into two sets: the poor and the non-poor. The identiﬁcation of that level
of income below which people are described as poor can follow an absolute or a relative approach.
While with an absolute approach the poverty line is deﬁned in an exogenous way and is the same
across distributions, with a relative approach the poverty line in a distribution is a function of the
distribution itself (e.g. the poverty line can be ﬁxed at half the median income level in that society).
1Notice that our general model can be related to behaviorally oriented notions of opportunity set by the following
interpretation. Let X be a possibly multidimensional space of relevant, observable functionings, N∗a population,
x ∈ XN∗
the proﬁle of achieved functionings within the population under consideration, and π = {π1,...,πn} ∈ Π(N)
a partition of the population into a ﬁnite set N = {1,...,n} o ft y p e sa c c o r d i n gt oaﬁxed set of veriﬁable criteria.
Then, the opportunity set of type i ∈ N at (x,π) is Xi = {x ∈ X : there exists j ∈ πi such that xj = x }POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 5
In a multidimensional setting the identiﬁcation step is not as simple. There are two diﬀerent
choices to be made. The ﬁrst is the choice of a threshold for each relevant dimension. The second is
the aggregation along the diﬀerent dimensions in order to evaluate the poverty of each individual.
As for the ﬁrst problem, our choice is implicit by the domain we are working with: each dimension
is modeled as a binary variable. One individual doeas have access to a speciﬁc opportunity or he
does not. There are not levels, either cardinal or ordinal, of access at a given dimension of well being.
As for the aggregation of the diﬀerent dimensions, there are two main approaches in the existing
literature on multidimensional poverty
2:o n ei st h eunion approach, which declares one person as
poor if he is below the threshold in a single dimension; the intersection approach instead regards
one person as poor if he is below the threshold in all the relevant dimensions.
In our framework, a poverty threshold (or poverty line) is a set T ∈ P[X],w h i c hi d e n t i ﬁes a
set of essential alternatives: an individual is declared as poor or, equivalently, he is declared to be
below the poverty threshold if her opportunity set does not contain all the essential alternatives,
i.e., all the alternatives contained in T. For instance, let X = {x1,x 2,...,xk} be the set of all
opportunities, N = {1,2,3} the relevant pupulation and T = {x1,x 3}. Then, at opportunity proﬁle
Y =( Y1= {x1,x 2,x 4,x 5,x 6},Y 2 = {x3,x 4},Y 3 = {x1,x 2,x 3}), population units 1 and 2 are poor,
while 3 is rich because Y1 ! T, Y2 ! T and T ⊂ Y3. Hence we follow the union approach to
identiﬁcation but we restrict it to the essential alternatives. As a matter of convenience, in our
presentation the set T is not dependent on the speciﬁcp r o ﬁle: i.e., in the identiﬁcation step we
adopt an absolute approach. However, our threshold can also be taken to be contingent on suitable
proﬁles of opportunity sets.3
It is worth emphasizing here that the distinction between essential and non essential alternatives
plays a crucial role in our axiomatic construction. One possible interpretation of such essential
alternatives is linked to the basic needs approach: having access to all essential alternatives in this
interpretation means being able to satisfy all basic needs. An alternative interpretation suggests
that the essential alternatives could represent certain basic functionings (see Sen (1985)) such as,
for example, life expectancy, literacy, and so on, or a set of primary goods (see Rawls (1971)). We
2For an "intermediate" solution, based on a variable minimal number of dimensions of deprivation see Alkire and
Foster (2008).
3In particular, the threshold T may be deﬁn e da dt h emedian of individual opportunity sets of a given distribution
(or perhaps more to the point as the median of the interval of opportunity sets ranging from the smallest to the median
opportunity set of the original distribution). Moreover, the threshold T may be regarded as the median of a set of
proposals advanced by members of a panel of experts. That is so, because the set of possible thresholds (i.e. the set
of subsets of X) is a in fact a distributive lattice with respect to the set-inclusion and therefore the median of any
subset of possible thresholds is well-deﬁned.6 VITO PERAGINE
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are aware or the crucial role played by the selection of the relevant dimensions in any empirical
analysis of poverty. However, we believe that the issue of selecting the relevant essential alternatives
lies substantially beyond the scope of the present paper: we assume that appropriate judgments on
this have been made, and we concern ourselves with the remaining theoretical challenges.
As for aggregation, the problem is that of amalgamating information on the deprivation suﬀered
by the poor in order to produce a suitable assessment of aggregate poverty. In the present setting,
our ﬁrst step involves the deﬁnition of a metric in the space of opportunity sets: in other words,
we need ﬁrst to deﬁne a criterion to compare individuals endowed with diﬀerent opportunity sets.
Thus, when is one person poorer (richer) than another person in terms of opportunities? There is
an extensive literature devoted to the problem of ranking opportunity sets (see on this the excellent
survey by Barberà, Bossert and Pattanaik (2004)). In order to answer such a question, we propose
a criterion such that all the sets above the poverty threshold are each other indiﬀerent; as for the
sets below the poverty thresholds, they are ranked by set inclusion. Therefore, we consider a unique
indiﬀerence class within the universe of the non—poor and we propose the very mild condition of set
inclusion as the reference ranking rule within the poor.
Formally, our starting point is a preorder <∗
T on P[X] induced by the poverty threshold T and
deﬁned as follows: for any Y,Z ∈ P[X],
Y <∗
T Z if and only if [Y ⊇ Z or Y ⊇ T].
The notation Y|T will be employed in the rest of this paper to denote opportunity proﬁle (Yi ∩
T)i∈N.A poverty ranking of opportunity proﬁles under threshold T is a preorder <T on P[X]N
such that for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, Y <TZ whenever Zi <∗
T Yi for each i ∈ N.
In the present work, we generalize two of the most widely used income poverty measures, namely
the head count ratio and the income poverty gap in a context of opportunity proﬁles:
Deﬁnition 1. The head-count (HC) poverty ranking under threshold T is the preorder <h
T on
P[X]N deﬁned as follows: for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,
Y < h
TZ if and only if hT(Y) ≥ hT(Z),w h e r ef o re a c hW ∈ P[X]N,
hT(W)=# HT(W) and HT(W)={i ∈ N : Wi + T}.
The head-count poverty ordering ranks two distributions on the basis of the number of individuals
that are below the poverty threshold T, hence, it captures the incidence of poverty. Although such a
measure gives useful information on the poverty in a distribution, the head-count does not take into
account the depth or the severity of the deprivation suﬀered by the poor. In order to capture thisPOVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 7
aspect of the aggregate poverty, we also propose the opportunity-gap (OG) poverty ranking which
measures the aggregate intensity of poverty.
Deﬁnition 2. The opportunity-gap (OG) poverty ranking under threshold T is the preorder <
g
T
on P[X]N deﬁned as follows: for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,
Y <
g
TZ if and only if gT(Y) ≥ gT(Z),w h e r e
for each W ∈ P[X]N, gT(W)=
X
i∈HT(W)
#{x : x ∈ T \ Wi}.
Thus, for each poor individual, the intensity of poverty, the “individual poverty gap”, is measured
by the number of essential alternatives she does not have access to. That is, for each poor individual
i, with opportunity set Wi, the "individual poverty gap" gT(Wi) is given by the following reﬁned
cardinality diﬀerence4 with respect to the threshold set T : gT(Wi)=|#(T) − #(Wi ∩ T)|.
The opportunity-gap poverty ranking5 aggregates this information by summing the individual
gaps; hence, it tells us how poor are the poor. In the following, we propose some desirable properties
that a poverty ranking should satisfy.
3. The basic characterizations
The axiomatic structure we propose will lead us to the characterization of the foregoing two
poverty criteria deﬁned above.
3.1. The axioms. We introduce now the following basic properties for a poverty ranking <T of
P[X]N:
Axiom 1 (Anonymity (AN)). For any permutation π of N,a n da n yY ∈ P[X]N: Y ∼TπY (where
πY =( Yπ(1),...,Yπ(n))).
Axiom 2 (Irrelevance of Inessential Opportunities (IIO)). For any Y ∈ P[X]N, i ∈ N,a n d
x ∈ Yi \ T: Y ∼T(Y−i,Y i \{ x}).
Axiom 3 (Irrelevance of Poor’s Opportunity Deletions (IPOD)). For any Y ∈ P[X]N, i ∈ HT(Y),
and x ∈ Yi: Y ∼T(Y−i,Y i \{ x}).
4The cardinality diﬀerence relation was introduced and axiomatically characterized by Kranich (1996).
5This is admittedly a quite crude ‘metric’ of opportunity gap that relies on the cardinality total preorder, which
has been widely studied in the literature on rankings of opportunity sets. To be sure, the latter criterion has been
also the target of sustained criticism. However, we submit, our version of the OG-poverty ranking may make much
sense as a ﬁrst approximation to a sound assessment of the aggregate ‘intensity of poverty’, whenever combined with
suitable deﬁnitions of the opportunity space and the poverty threshold.8 VITO PERAGINE
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Axiom 4 (Dominance at Essential Proﬁles (DEP)). For any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that both {Y1,...,Yn} ⊆
{T,∅} and {Z1,...,Zn} ⊆ {T,∅},
Y ÂTZ if and only if #{i ∈ N : Yi = ∅} > #{i ∈ N : Zi = ∅}.
The ﬁrst three axioms are invariance properties, in the sense that they require our poverty
rankings to ignore certain aspects of the opportunity distributions and to focus on others. The ﬁrst,
Anonymity, is an axiom that requires a symmetric treatment of individuals, thereby preventing from
paying attention to the identities of individuals. Irrelevance of Inessential Opportunities says that
if the opportunity set of an individual i is reduced by the subtraction of an alternative which is not
essential, then the new proﬁle of opportunity sets exhibits the same degree of poverty as the original
proﬁle. This axiom is reminiscent of the Focus axiom, used in the income poverty paradigm, which
requires invariance with respect to reduction in the incomes of the non-poor; however, instead of
distinguishing between the poor and the non-poor, in the current scenario the basic distinction is
between essential and non essential alternatives. Irrelevance of Poor’s Opportunity Deletions says
that if the opportunity set of a poor individual i i sr e d u c e db yt h es u b t r a c t i o no fa na l t e r n a t i v e ,
then the new proﬁle of opportunity sets exhibits the same degree of poverty as the original proﬁle.
While the previous invariance properties are useful in identifying the information that our poverty
rankings should use, the last axiom is a dominance property,w h i c hi d e n t i ﬁes classes of transformation
that have a certain eﬀect on the poverty rankings, thereby restricting the set of poverty criteria.
Dominance at Essential Proﬁles indeed considers a particular case in which two ‘degenerate’ proﬁles
are composed of either empty sets or sets coinciding with the poverty threshold T. In this special
case, one proﬁles exhibit more poverty than the other if the number of people endowed with the
empty set in the former is higher than the number of individuals endowed with an empty set in the
latter.
Our ﬁrst proposition shows that these axioms are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
characterization of the HD-poverty ranking <h
T:
Proposition 1. Let <T be a poverty ranking of P[X]N under threshold T ⊆ X. Then <T is the HC
ranking <h
T if and only if <T satisﬁes AN, IIO, IPOD and DEP. Moreover, such a characterization
is tight.
We now introduce two further axioms:
Axiom 5 (Strict Monotonicity with respect to Essential Deletions (SMED)). For any Y ∈ P[X]N,
i ∈ N,a n dx ∈ Yi ∩ T: (Y−i,Y i \{ x})ÂTY.POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 9
Axiom 6 (Independence of Balanced Essential Deletions (IBED)). For any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, i ∈ N,
y ∈ Yi ∩ T and z ∈ Zi ∩ T: Y <TZ if and only if (Y−i,Y i \{ y})<T(Z−i,Z i \{ z}).
Strict Monotonicity with respect to Essential Deletions is another dominance property which
says that if the opportunity set of an individual i is reduced by the subtraction of an essential
alternative, then the new proﬁle of opportunity sets exhibits a higher degree of poverty than the
original proﬁle. This axiom is a direct translation in our context of the Monotonicity axiom used in
the income inequality paradigm (see Foster (2006)); again the diﬀerence relies on the fact that in
the current scenario the crucial distinction is between essential and non essential alternatives rather
than between poor and non-poor individuals.
Finally, we propose a standard independence axiom, Independence of Balanced Essential Dele-
tions, which pertains to the deletion of an essential alternative from the set of an individual i in
two opportunity proﬁles Y,Z. Such balanced deletions preserves the ranking of the two opportunity
proﬁles.
The ﬁrst two and the last two axioms of this section are necessary and suﬃcient to characterize
our poverty-gap criterion:
Proposition 2. Let <T be a poverty ranking of P[X]N under threshold T ⊆ X.T h e n<T is the OG
ranking <
g
T if and only if <T satisﬁes AN, IIO, SMED and IBED. Moreover, such a characterization
is tight.
Thus, we provide two simple characterizations of the most basic poverty rankings of opportunity
proﬁles. We would like to stress that, to the best of our knowledge, those results have no counterpart
in the standard literature on poverty indices of income distributions, though the head-count and
poverty-gap are the most widely used criteria in the theoretical and empirical literature on poverty.
4. Composite rankings
In this section, we propose and axiomatically characterize two lexicographic orderings based on
the HC and OG rankings and third one based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap
criteria.
The ﬁrst composite criterion, the (HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking, combines in a lexicographic
order the HG and the OG rankings, with priority given to the HC criterion.
Deﬁnition 3. A (HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking of opportunity proﬁles under threshold T








T is a preorder deﬁned as follow: for any10 VITO PERAGINE
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T Z if and only if either Y Â
h
TZ or (Y ∼
h
TZ and gT(Y) ≥ gT(Z)).
The (GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking also combines in a lexicographic order the HG and the
OG rankings, but with priority given to the OG criterion.
Deﬁnition 4. A (GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking of opportunity proﬁles under threshold T












T Z if and only if either Y Â
g
TZ or (Y ∼
g
TZ and hT(Y) ≥ hT(Z)).
Finally, the (HG)- weighted poverty ranking linearly c o m b i n e st h eH Ga n dt h eO Gc r i t e r i a .







T is a preorder deﬁned as follow: there exist w1,
w2 ∈ R++ such that, for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,
Y <
w
TZ if and only if w1hT(Y)+w2gT(Y) ≥w1hT(Z)+w2gT(Z).
4.1. More axioms. In order to characterize such composite rankings, we now propose the following
axioms:
Axiom 7 (Qualiﬁed Independence of Balanced Essential Deletions (Q-IBED)). For any Y,Z ∈
P[X]N, for any y,z ∈ X and for any i ∈ N,s u c ht h a tYi ⊂ T, Zi ⊂ T, y ∈ Yi ∩ T and z ∈ Zi ∩ T:
Y <TZ if and only if (Y−i,Y i \{ y})<T(Z−i,Z i \{ z}).
The Q-IBED axiom pertains to the deletion of an essential alternative from the set of a poor
individual i in two opportunity proﬁles Y,Z. Such balanced deletions preserves the ranking of the
two opportunity proﬁles. This axiom is implied by the axiom introduced before, Independence of
Balanced Essential Deletions.
Axiom 8 (Conditional Dominance (CD)). Let <T be a poverty ranking with threshold T.S u p -
pose there exist a positive integer k and f1,...,fk ∈ RP[X]N
, such that for all Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,
fi (Y)=fi (Z), i =1 ,...,k entails Y ∼T Z. Then, for all Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, (f1 (Y),...,fk (Y)) 6=
(f1 (Z),...,fk (Z)) and fi (Y) ≥ fi (Z),i=1 ,...,k entails Y ÂT Z.
In order to compare any two opportunity proﬁles in terms of poverty, we set a ﬁnite number of
real-valued evaluation function on P[X]N. Then, according to the Conditional Dominance axiom, ifPOVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 11
any function evaluates the ﬁrst distribution as equivalent to the second one, we conclude that both
opportunity proﬁles have the same degree of poverty no matter how we decide to measure it. On the
other hand, if all evaluation functions consider the value associated to the ﬁrst distribution as great
as the value associated to the other one, then the CD axiom says that we are forced to conclude
that the ﬁrst proﬁle shows at least as much poverty as the second one in terms of opportunity.
Axiom 9 (Non-Compensation (NC)). Let <T be a poverty ranking with threshold T.S u p p o s et h e r e
exist a positive integer k and f1,...,fk ∈ RP[X]N
,s u c ht h a t :
(i): for all Y,Z ∈ P[X]N:i ffi (Y)=fi (Z), i =1 ,...,k,t h e nY ∼T Z,
(ii): there exist Y,Z ∈ P[X]N and i∗ ∈ {1,...,k}, such that fi∗ (Y) >f i∗ (Z) and fj (Z) >
fj (y)for any j ∈ {1,...,k}, j 6= i∗,a n dY ÂT Z.
Then for all U,V ∈ P[X]N: U ÂT V whenever fi∗ (U) >f i∗ (V).
Condition NC prevents trade-oﬀs among factors and is therefore needed to set the basic feature
of lexicographic rankings (see e.g. Fishburn (1975) where a similar condition is introduced in order
to characterize lexicographic orderings over products of ordered sets).
The next two axioms propose two diﬀerent and alternative dominance conditions, based on two
basic transformation. Consider a proﬁle Y and two individuals, i and j, which are just below the
poverty thresholds: that is, they miss just one essential opportunity, say x and y respectively. Now
consider two diﬀerent transformations of proﬁle Y: (i) the transfer of opportunity y from j to i; (ii)
the deletion of one opportunity from the opportunity set available to j. By the joint eﬀect of this
double transformation, the number of individuals below the poverty thresholds has decreased, as
now i is not poor anymore while j is still poor (poorer than before); however the aggregate number
of opportunities that individuals i and j do not have has increased. What is the net eﬀect on our
poverty ranking? The answer will depend on the speciﬁc weight we give to the number of poor in
our society vis a vis to the aggregate severity of poverty. The two axioms we propose give diﬀerent
and opposite answers: according to the Local Head-Count-Priority, poverty decreases; according to
Local Gap-Priority, poverty increases. Formally,
Axiom 10 (Local Head-Count Priority (HP)). Let <T be a poverty ranking with threshold T,s u c h
that #T ≥ 3.F o ra n yY,Z ∈ P[X]N,i f[ t h e r ee x i s ti,j ∈ N and x,y,z ∈ T, with x 6= y 6= z 6= x,
such that for any l 6= i,j, Yl = Zl, Yi = T\{x}, Yj = T\{y},Z i = T,a n dZj = ∅],then Y ÂTZ.
Axiom 11 (Local Gap-Priority (GP)). Let <T be a poverty ranking with threshold T,s u c ht h a t
#T ≥ 3.F o ra n yY,Z ∈ P[X]N,i f[ t h e r ee x i s ti,j ∈ N and x,y,z ∈ T, with x 6= y 6= z 6= x, such
that for any l 6= i,j, Yl = Zl, Yi = T\{x}, Yj = T\{y},Z i = T,a n dZj = ∅],then Z ÂTY.12 VITO PERAGINE
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The foregoing two ﬁnal axioms set the basis for a lexicographic combination of the Head Count
and Opportunity Gap criteria.
The last axiom is a quite standard and technical axiom in social choice theory, generally used for
the characterization of utilitarian social welfare functions.
Axiom 12 (Cardinal Unit-Comparability (CUC)). Let <T be a poverty ranking with threshold T.
Suppose there exist a positive integer k and f1,...,fk ∈ RP[X]N
, such that for all Y,Z ∈ P[X]N:i f





ϕ =( ϕ1,...,ϕk):ϕi ∈ RR,i=1 ,...,k such that there exist





Then, for all Y,Z,V,U ∈ P[X]N, Y <TZ , (f1 (U),...,fk (U)) = ((ϕ1◦f1)(Y),...,(ϕk◦fk)(Y))
and (f1 (V),...,fk (V)) = ((ϕ1 ◦ f1)(Z),...,(ϕk ◦ fk)(Z)) with ϕ =( ϕ1,...,ϕk) ∈ Φ entail U <TV.
CUC induces an information environment where the admissible transformations are increasing
aﬃne functions and, in addition, the scaling unit must be the same for all individuals. This as-
sumption allows for interpersonal comparisons of diﬀerences in the selected parameters (namely, in
our case, hT and gT). However, parameter levels cannot be compared interpersonally because the
intercepts of the aﬃne transformations may diﬀer arbitrarily across individuals.
4.2. More results. The next characterizations rely on a simple Lemma showing that if a ranking
of opportunity proﬁles satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP and Q−IBED then two opportunity proﬁles must
be indiﬀerent whenever they exhibit the same number of poor and the same aggregate poverty gap.
In other words, this Lemma shows that any such a ranking is speciﬁed by just two parameters
(namely hT and gT).
Lemma 1. Let <T be a poverty ranking on P[X]N and a total preorder which satisﬁes AN, IIO,
DEP and Q − IBED.T h e n ,f o ra n yY,Z ∈ P[X]N, (hT (Y),g T (Y)) = (hT (Z),g T (Z)) entails
Y ∼TZ.
We are now able to characterize our composite rankings. The ﬁrst proposition characterizes the
(HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking <
hg
T which uses the opportunity-gap criterion as a reﬁnement
of the head-count one.
Proposition 3. Let <T be a poverty ranking of P[X]N under threshold T ⊆ X, such that #T ≥ 3,
and a total preorder. Then, <T = <
hg
T if and only if <T satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD,
NC, and HP. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 13
The next proposition characterizes the (GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking <
gh
T which employs
the head-count criterion in order to reﬁne the opportunity-gap one.
Proposition 4. Let <T be a poverty ranking of P[X]N under threshold T ⊆ X such that #T ≥ 3,
and a total preorder. Then, <T = <
gh
T if and only if <T satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC,
and GP. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.
Our ﬁnal proposition characterizes the class of (HG)- weighted poverty rankings.
Proposition 5. Let <T be a poverty ranking of P[X]N under threshold T ⊆ X and a total preorder,
and suppose n>#T ≥ 2.T h e n ,<T = <w
T for some w =( w1,w 2) ∈ (RÂ{0})2 if and only if <T
satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD and CUC. Moreover, such a characterization is tight.




T ,a n d<w
T rely on a common core properties. Within
the class of rankings that satisﬁes those properties, the Non-Compensation axiom identiﬁes the
lexicographic combinations of the head-count and opportunity-gap criteria, while Cardinal Unit
Comparability axiom is strong enough to characterize the class of rankings induced by a their linear
combination.6
5. Final remarks
The need for complementing the traditional evaluation of income poverty by an analysis of the
deprivation suﬀered in many dimensions of individual and social life has been forcefully defended by
many economists in the last decades. Such a measurement extension may substantially improve our
understanding of the poverty in a society and may well have far-reaching policy implications. To
keep the analysis as general as possible, in this paper the diﬀerent dimensions have been treated in
an abstract way: we have deﬁned an opportunity set as any ﬁnite set in some arbitrary space and we
have attempted to outline an axiomatic theory for the measurement of poverty of opportunity. To
the best of our knowledge, there have been no previous attempts to compare proﬁles of opportunity
sets on the basis of poverty.
We have characterized two fundamental rankings, the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap
poverty rankings, which generalize the most known poverty measures used in the income poverty
framework, namely the head count ratio and the income poverty gap. In addition, we have charac-
terized axiomatically two lexicographic rankings based on the HC and OG rankings and a third one
based on a linear combination of the head-count and gap criteria.
6It is worth noticing that the structure of our proof of Proposition 5 replicates to a large extent the style of proof
of Theorem 4.4 in Dutta and Sen (1996) as subsequently amended by Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester (2005).14 VITO PERAGINE
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We are aware of the critique of the head-count and poverty-gap measures, formulated by Sen
within the income poverty framework, and based on their inability to take into account the inequality
among the poor. This critique has led to the characterization of richer families of income poverty
indices (see Clark et al. (1981) and Foster et al. (1984)). It would be interesting to study such an
extension in our setting.
Moreover, we have only considered comparisons of opportunity proﬁles for a ﬁxed population.
A possible extension of our analysis would be to compare the opportunities available to societies
with diﬀerent numbers of individuals. This would make it possible to rank opportunity proﬁles for
diﬀerent countries, diﬀerent demographic groups, and for diﬀerent time periods.
Finally, the recent availability of individual data on diﬀerent dimensions of poverty makes it
possible an empirical application based on the rankings characterized in this paper. All these topics
will be the object of future research.
6. Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . (A) It is straightforward to check that <h
T is a poverty ranking and does
indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP and IPOD.
Conversely, suppose <T is a poverty ranking that satisﬁes AN, NT, IIO, and IPOD. Now, consider
Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Y <TZ. Then, by repeated application of IIO and transitivity, Y|T<TZ|T.
Next, observe that (TN\HT(Y),∅HT(Y)) ∼T Y|T<TZ|T ∼T (T N\HT(Z),∅HT(Z)), by repeated
application of IPOD. Let us now suppose that hT(Z) >h T(Y): then, by AN and DEP, Z ÂTY,a
contradiction. Hence, hT(Y) ≥ hT(Z), i.e. Y <
h
TZ.
To prove the reverse inclusion, suppose that Y <
h
TZ, i.e. hT(Y) ≥ hT(Z). Then, consider
(TN\HT(Y),∅HT(Y)), (T N\HT(Z),∅HT(Z)) and a permutation π of N such that π(HT(Z)) ⊆ π(HT(Y)).
By IIO, Y ∼T (TN\HT(Y),∅HT(Y)) and Z ∼T (TN\HT(Z),∅HT(Z));b yA N ,(T N\HT(Y),∅HT(Y)) ∼T
(Tπ(N\HT(Y)),∅π(HT(Y))) and (TN\HT(Z),∅HT(Z)) ∼T (Tπ(N\HT(Z)),∅π(HT(Z))).
Clearly, if π(HT(Z)) = π(HT(Y)),t h e n(Tπ(N\HT(Y)),∅π(HT(Y)))=( Tπ(N\HT(Z)),∅π(HT(Z))),
hence, by transitivity of <T, Y ∼TZ.
Let us then suppose that π(HT(Z)) ⊂ π(HT(Y)). By DEP, it follows that:
(Tπ(N\HT(Y)),∅π(HT(Y)))ÂT(Tπ(N\HT(Z)),∅π(HT(Z))),
hence, in particular, Y <TZ.
(B) The characterization provided above is tight. To check the validity of this claim, consider
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i) To begin with, consider the non-anonymous reﬁnement of HG deﬁned by the following rule:
Y <
h1
T Z if and only if:
a) Y <
h






TZ,t h e r ee x i s ti,j ∈ N such {Yi,Z j} ∩ {T,∅} = ∅,a n dY1 + T.
Clearly, <
h1
T is a poverty ranking that satisﬁes IIO, IPOD and DEP, but violates AN.
ii) Consider the reﬁnement of HC deﬁned by the following rule: Y <
h∗





TZ and #{i ∈ N : Yi ⊃ T} ≤ #{i ∈ N : Zi ⊃ T}. Such a preorder is a poverty ranking that
satisﬁes AN, DEP and IPOD but violates IIO.
iii) Consider the universal indiﬀerence poverty ranking: i.e. Y <
IZ for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N.T h a t
ranking does satisfy AN, IIO and IPOD but violates DEP.
iv) Consider the OG-reﬁnement of HC as deﬁned by the following rule: Y <
hg
T Z if and only if
either Y Â
h
TZ or (Y ∼
h
TZ and gT(Y) ≥ gT(Z)). Such a preorder is a poverty ranking that satisﬁes
A N ,I I Oa n dD E P ,b u tf a i l st os a t i s f yI P O D . ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . (A) It is easily checked that <
g
T is a poverty ranking and does satisfy AN,
IIO, SMED and IBED.
Conversely, suppose <T is a poverty ranking that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,S M E Da n dI B E D .
Then, consider Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Y <TZ. Again, by repeated application of IIO and
transitivity, Y|T<TZ|T. Now, suppose that gT(Z) >g T(Y). Then, by repeated application of
IBED, Z0
|T∼TY|T for some Z0 such that Z0
i ⊆ Zi for each i ∈ N,a n dg T(Z0)=gT(Y).I tf o l l o w s
that, by repeated application of SMED, Z|TÂTZ0
|T, hence by transitivity, Z|TÂTY|T. Thus, by
repeated application of IIO and transitivity again, Z ÂTY,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
On the other hand, suppose that Y <
g
TZ, i.e. gT(Y) ≥ gT(Z), and consider T =( T,...,T) ∈
P[X]N.O f c o u r s e , T ∼T T,b yr e ﬂexivity. Then, by AN and repeated application of IBED to
T ∼T T, it follows that Y0<TZ for some Y0 such that Y 0
i \ T = Yi \ T and Yi ⊆ Y 0
i for each i ∈ N,
and gT(Y0)=gT(Z). If, in particular, gT(Y0)=gT(Y) then Y0 = Y, hence Y <TZ,a n dw ea r e
done. Otherwise, there exist i ∈ N and x ∈ T ∩(Y 0
i \Yi), hence Y ÂTZ by transitivity and repeated
application of SMED. In any case, Y <TZ as required.
(B) The foregoing characterization is also tight. To verify that claim consider the following
examples.16 VITO PERAGINE
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i) Take the following non-anonymous reﬁnement of the OG poverty ranking: Y <
g1
T Z if and only
if Y Â
g
TZ or (Y ∼
g
TZ, Y1 + T and Z1 ∩ T ⊇ Y1 ∩ T). That ranking satisﬁes IIO, SMED and IBED
but fails to satisfy AN.
ii) Consider the following reﬁnement of the OG poverty ranking: Y <
g∗









i∈N #(ZirT)). That ranking satisﬁes AN, SMED and IBED
but fails to satisfy IIO.
iii) Consider again the universal indiﬀerence ranking: i.e. Y <
IZ for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N.T h a t
preorder is a poverty ranking which does satisfy AN, IIO and IBED but violates SMED.
iv) Consider the HC-reﬁnement of the OG poverty ranking: Y <
gh





TZ and hT(Y) ≥ hT(Z)). That poverty ranking satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,S M E Db u tv i o l a t e s
IBED. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Let us suppose hT (Y)=hT (Z), gT (Y)=gT (Z). Also, notice that for any

























= k for some m,k non-negative





with e Vi = T if Vi ⊇ T,








since e V does not alter the set of poor
population units in V|T.N e x t ,Y|T<TZ|T if and only if e Y<T e Z by AN and a repeated application








, it follows by DEP that
neither e YÂT e Z nor e ZÂT e Y. Therefore, e Y∼T e Z because <T is a total preorder. Finally, Y∼TY
|T
and Z∼TZ
|Tby repeated applications of IIO. It follows, by transitivity, that Y∼TZ. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . (A) Again, it is easily checked that <
hg
T does indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP,
Q-IBED, CD, NC and HP.
On the other hand, let <T be a poverty ranking and a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,
Q-IBED, CD, NC and HP.
Let Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,s u c ht h a tY <
hg
T Z, then one of the following cases obtains:
a) hT (Y) >h T (Z) and gT (Y)=gT (Z)
b) hT (Y) >h T (Z) and gT (Y) >g T (Z)
c) hT (Y) >h T (Z) and gT (Z) >g T (Y)
d) hT (Y)=hT (Z) and gT (Y) >g T (Z)
e) hT (Y)=hT (Z) and gT (Y)=gT (Z)POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 17
Under case a) b), d) Y ÂTZ by CD. Under case c), Y ÂTZ by Lemma 1 and NC and HP.I ne )
by Lemma 1 Y ∼TZ. Hence, in any case, Y <TZ.
Conversely, let Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,s u c ht h a tY <TZ, then the following cases should be distinguished:
1) hT (Y) >h T (Z)
2) hT (Z) >h T (Y)
3) hT (Y)=hT (Z) and gT (Y) >g T (Z)
4) hT (Y)=hT (Z) and gT (Z) >g T (Y)
5) hT (Y)=hT (Z) and gT (Z)=gT (Y).
Under case 1), 3), Y Â
hg
T Z by deﬁnition. Under case 2), two subcases should be distinguished,
namely either gT (Z) ≥ gT (Y) or gT (Y) >g T (Z).I f gT (Z) ≥ gT (Y) then by CD Z ÂTY,a
contradiction. If, on the contrary, gT (Y) >g T (Z) then, by Lemma 1 and NC and HP, Z ÂTY a
contradiction again. Moreover, under case 4) by CD Z ÂTY, a contradiction. Finally, under case
5 ) ,w eh a v et h a tY ∼
hg
T Z by deﬁnition. Hence, the desired result follows.
(B) The characterization of <
hg
T provided above is tight. Indeed, consider the following examples:
i) Take the following non-anonymous reﬁnement of the (HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking:
Y <
hg1
T Z if and only if Y Â
hg
T Z or (Y ∼
hg
T Z , {Y1,...,Yn,Z 1,...,Zn} * {T,∅} and #(Y1 ∩ T) ≤
#(Z1 ∩ T)). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁes IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and HP
but fails to satisfy AN.
ii) Consider the following reﬁnement of the (HG)- lexicographic poverty ranking: Y <
hg2
T Z if
and only if Y Â
hg




i∈N #(Yi rT) ≤
P
i∈N #(Zi rT)). That ranking is a total
preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,D E P ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,N Ca n dH Pb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yI I O .
iii) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
hg3
T Z if and only if
P
i∈N,Yi+T #(Yi ∩ T) ≥
P
i∈N,Zi+T #(Zi ∩ T). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,N C
and HP but fails to satisfy DEP.
iv) Choose x∗ ∈ T, and consider the following reﬁnement of the (HG)- lexicographic poverty
ranking: Y <
hg4
T Z if and only if Y Â
hg
T Z or (Y ∼
hg
T Z and either [x∗ ∈ (Yi∗ ∩ Zj∗)] or [x∗ / ∈ Yi∗],
where i∗ =m i n{i ∈ N : Yi + T} and j∗ =m i n{i ∈ N : Zi + T}). That ranking is a total preorder
that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,C D ,N Ca n dH Pb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yQ - I B E D .
v) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
hg5
T Z if and only if either [{Yi,Z i} ⊆ {T,∅} for
each i ∈ N] or [there exists i ∈ N such that Yi / ∈ {T,∅}].I t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t <
hg5
T is indeed a
total preorder: moreover, it satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, NC and HP but not CD.
vi) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
hg6
T Z if and only if w1 · hT(Y)+w2 · gT(Y) ≥
w1 · hT(Z)+w2 · gT(Z) with w1 = t − 2+ ,   ∈ R+\{0},   ≈ 0,a n dw2 =1 .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
<
hg6
T is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,a n dH Pb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yN C .18 VITO PERAGINE
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vii) Consider the poverty ranking <
gh
T : clearly enough, it is a total preorder that satisﬁes AN,
IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and NC, but not HP. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . (A) The proof replicates almost verbatim the previous one. We reproduce
it here for the sake of completeness.
It is easily checked that <
gh
T does indeed satisfy AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP.
On the other hand, let <T be a poverty ranking and a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,
Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP.
Let Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,s u c ht h a tY <
gh
T Z, then one of the following cases obtains:
a) gT (Y) >g T (Z) and hT (Y)=hT (Z)
b) gT (Y) >g T (Z) and hT (Y) >h T (Z)
c) gT (Y) >g T (Z) and hT (Z) >h T (Y)
d) gT (Y)=gT (Z) and hT (Y) >h T (Z)
e) gT (Y)=gT (Z) and hT (Y)=hT (Z)
Under case a) b), d) Y ÂTZ by CD. Under case c), Y ÂTZ by Lemma 1 and NC and HP.I ne )
by Lemma 1 Y ∼TZ. Hence, in any case, Y <TZ.
Conversely, let Y,Z ∈ P[X]N,s u c ht h a tY <TZ, then the following cases should be distinguished:
1) gT (Y) >g T (Z)
2) gT (Z) >g T (Y)
3) gT (Y)=gT (Z) and hT (Y) >h T (Z)
4) gT (Y)=gT (Z) and hT (Z) >h T (Y)
5) gT (Y)=gT (Z) and hT (Z)=hT (Y).
Under case 1), 3), Y Â
gh
T Z by deﬁnition. Under case 2), two subcases should be distinguished,
namely either hT (Z) ≥ hT (Y) or hT (Y) >h T (Z).I f hT (Z) ≥ hT (Y) then, by CD, Z ÂTY,a
contradiction. If, on the contrary, hT (Y) >h T (Z) then, by Lemma 1 and NC and GP, Z ÂTY a
contradiction again. Moreover, under case 4), by CD, Z ÂTY a contradiction. Finally, under case
5 ) ,w eh a v et h a tY ∼
gh
T Z by deﬁnition. Hence, the desired result.
(B) The characterization of <
gh
T provided above is also tight. Indeed, consider the following
examples.
i) Take the following non-anonymous reﬁnement of the (GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking:
Y <
gh1
T Z if and only if Y Â
gh
T Z or (Y ∼
gh
T Z , {Y1,...,Yn,Z 1,...,Zn} * {T,∅} and #(Y1 ∩ T) ≤
#(Z1 ∩ T)). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁes IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, NC and GP
but fails to satisfy AN.POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 19
ii) Consider the following reﬁnement of the (GH)- lexicographic poverty ranking: Y <
gh2
T Z if
and only if Y Â
gh




i∈N #(Yi rT) ≤
P
i∈N #(Zi rT)). That ranking is a total
preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,D E P ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,N Ca n dG Pb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yI I O .
iii) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
gh3
T Z if and only if
P
i∈N,Yi+T #(Yi ∩ T) ≤
P
i∈N,Zi+T #(Zi ∩ T). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,N C
and GP but fails to satisfy DEP.
iv) Choose x∗ ∈ T, and consider the following reﬁnement of the (GH)- lexicographic poverty
ranking: Y <
gh4
T Z if and only if Y Â
gh
T Z or (Y ∼
gh
T Z and either [x∗ ∈ (Yi∗ ∩ Zj∗)] or [x∗ / ∈ Yi∗],
where i∗ =m i n{i ∈ N : Yi + T} and j∗ =m i n{i ∈ N : Zi + T}). That ranking is a total preorder
that satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, CD, NC and GP but fails to satisfy Q-IBED.
v) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
gh5
T Z if and only if either [{Yi,Z i} ⊆ {T,∅} for
each i ∈ N ] or [there exists i ∈ N such that Zi / ∈ {T,∅}].I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t<
gh5
T is indeed a
total preorder: moreover, it satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, NC and HP but not CD.
vi) Consider the following poverty ranking: Y <
gh6
T Z if and only if w1 · hT(Y)+w2 · gT(Y) ≥
w1 · hT(Z)+w2 · gT(Z) with w1 = t − 2 −  ,   ∈ R+\{0},   ≈ 0,a n dw2 =1 .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
<
gh6
T is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,Q - I B E D ,C D ,a n dG Pb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yN C .
vii) Consider the poverty ranking <
hg
T : clearly, it is a total preorder that satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP,
Q-IBED, CD, and NC, but not GP. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . (A) Checking that <w
T is a poverty ranking which satisﬁes AN, IIO, DEP,
Q-IBED, CD, and CUC is straightforward. Then, we only need to prove the ‘if’ part.
First, notice that for any Y ∈ P[X]N, hT(Y), gT(Y) ∈ Z+, hT(Y) ≤ n,a n dhT(Y) 6 gT(Y) 6
n · t ,w h e r et =# T. Now, take any poverty ranking <T that is a total preorder and satisﬁes AN,
IIO, DEP, Q-IBED, CD, and CUC.
We distinguish two basic cases, namely:
Case I:T h e r ee x i s tY,Z ∈ P[X]N, such that A =( hT(Y),g T(Y))6=(hT(Z),g T(Z)) = B and
Y ∼T Z .
Then, observe that all points lying on line joining A and B are ∼T indiﬀerent. Indeed, A ∼T B
by hypothesis. Then, A − A ∼T B − A, i.e. O ∼T B − A by CUC. Hence, for any λ>0,
O ∼T λ(B−A) by CUC , which, in turn, entails A ∼T λ(B−A)+A. Similarly, O ∼T B−A implies
that −(B − A) ∼T O. Then, for any λ>0, λ(−(B − A)) ∼T O, entails A + λ(−(B − A)) ∼T A.
Let us denote w1x + w2y = k,w i t hw1,w 2 ∈ R+\{0} and k ∈ R t h er e a ll i n ej o i n i n gY and Z.
Moreover, observe that by CUC, E =( hT(Y)+δ1,g T(Y)+δ2) ∼T (hT(Z)+δ1,g T(Z)+δ2)=D for20 VITO PERAGINE
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any δ1,δ2 ∈ R. Therefore, all proper indiﬀerence curves are parallel to each other. Of course, there
might exist a ﬁnite number of isolated points. But, then for each one of them, one can draw a line
through it which is parallel to the other indiﬀerence curves. Finally, notice that by CD U ÂT V
whenever w1hT(U)+w2gT(U)=k1, w1hT(V)+w2gT(V)=k2 and k1 >k 2. Therefore, <T = <w
T
by deﬁnition of <w
T.
Case II: There is no pair Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that (hT(Y),g T(Y))6=(hT(Z),g T(Z)) and Y ∼T Z,
hence for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that (hT(Y),g T(Y))6=(hT(Z),g T(Z)) either Y ÂT Z or Z ÂT Y.
Of course, if (hT(Y),g T(Y))=(hT(Z),g T(Z)) then w1hT(Y)+w2gT(Y)=w1hT(Z)+w2gT(Z)
for any w1,w 2 ∈ R+,a n d ,b yL e m m a1 ,Y ∼T Z .M o r e o v e r , i f (hT(Y),g T(Y))>(hT(Z),g T(Z))
and (hT(Y),g T(Y))6=(hT(Z),g T(Z)),t h e nw1hT(Y)+w2gT(Y) >w 1hT(Z)+w2gT(Z) for any
w1,w 2 ∈ R+\{0}, and, by CD, Y ÂT Z.
Therefore, it suﬃces to check pairs Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that either:
i) hT(Y) >h T(Z) and gT(Z)) >g T(Y) (also denoted, relying on an obvious choice of a
Cartesian coordinate system in the real plane, as Z ∈ NW(Y) i.e. ‘Z is North-West of Y’) or
ii) hT(Z) >h T(Y) and gT(Y)) >g T(Z) (also denoted as Y ∈ NW(Z) i.e. ‘Y is North-West
of Z’).
First, consider any <T such that for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, Y ÂT Z whenever Y ∈ NW(Z).
It is clearly the case that w1hT(Y)+w2gT(Y) >w 1hT(Z)+w2gT(Z) for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N
such that Y ∈ NW(Z),p r o v i d e d
w2(gT(Y) − gT(Z)) >w 1(hT(Z) − hT(Y)) or equivalently whenever w2





gT(Y)−gT(Z) ≤ n − 1 for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Y ∈ NW(Z).
Now, consider any <T such that for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, Y ÂT Z whenever Z ∈ NW(Y).
Clearly, w1hT(Y)+w2gT(Y) >w 1hT(Z)+w2gT(Z) for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Z ∈
NW(Y),p r o v i d e dw1(hT(Y) − hT(Z)) >w 2(gT(Z) − gT(Y)), i.e. whenever w1
w2 >n· (t − 1) − t
since
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) ≤ (n − 1) · t − n = n · (t − 1) − t for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Z ∈ NW(Y).
Therefore, it only remains to be considered the case of a total preorder <T with the required prop-
erties such that there exist Y,Z,Y0,Z0 ∈ P[X]N,w i t hY ÂT Z and Y0 ÂT Z0, while Y ∈ NW(Z)
and Z0 ∈ NW(Y0).I nt h i sc a s e ,p o s i tm− =m a x
n
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) : Z ∈ NW(Y) and Y ÂT Z
o
and
m+ =m i n
n
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) : Z ∈ NW(Y) and Z ÂT Y
o
(notice that m+and m− are both well de-
ﬁned under our special hypothesis on <T).
N e x t ,w es h a l lp r o v et h a tm− <m + (the proof is along the same lines of that provided in
Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester (2005): we reproduce it here for the sake of completeness).POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 21
Indeed, let us ﬁrst suppose that m− = m+. Then, there exist Y,Z,Y0,Z0 ∈ P[X]N such that





























































by some further simple algebra
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(hT(Y0),g T(Y0)) = (α · hT(Y)+β1,α· gT(Y)+β2) and
(hT(Z0),g T(Z0)) = (α · hT(Z)+β1,α· gT(Z)+β2)
with α =
hT(Y0)−hT(Z0)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) > 0, β1 =
hT(Y)·hT(Z0)−hT(Y0)·hT(Z)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) , β2 =
gT(Y0)·gT(Z)−gT(Y)·gT(Z0)
gT(Z)−gT(Y) .
Thus, CUC applies and Y ÂT Z implies Y0 <T Z0, a contradiction.
Suppose then that m− =
p
q > r
s = m+ with both
p
q and r
s irreducible fractions. Let us consider
a few exhaustive subcases, namely
i) p ≥ r, q ≤ s. Clearly, it must be the case that p>ror q<s(or both). Then, one may select




If p = r then q<s , hence m− = r
q >m +: thus, consider Y,Z ∈ P[X]N such that Y ∈ NW(Z)
and
gT(Y)−gT(Z)
hT(Z)−hT(Y) = m−.B y d e ﬁnition of m−, Z ÂT Y. But then, by applying to the pairs
(Y,Z),(U,V) the very same argument used above for excluding m− = m+,a n dr e p e a t i n gt h es a m e
calculations, it follows that CUC applies to the eﬀect of implying V <T U, hence indeed V ÂT U
in view of the general hypothesis of Case II we are considering now. On the other hand, consider22 VITO PERAGINE
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gT(U) − gT(V0)=r,a n dgT(V0)=gT(V). Hence, by the same argument as above, CUC applies
and implies U <T V0(in fact, U ÂT V0). Moreover,
hT(V0)=hT(U)+s = hT(U)+( s − q)+hT(V) − hT(U)=hT(V)+( s − q) >h T(V).
Thus, by CD, V0 ÂT V and by transitivity U ÂT V ,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
If q = s then p>r , hence m− > r
s = m+:c o n s i d e rY,Z ∈ P[X]N,s u c ht h a tY ∈ NW(Z)
and
gT(Y)−gT(Z)
hT(Z)−hT(Y) = m+.B y d e ﬁnition of m+, Y ÂT Z. But then, by applying again to the
pairs (Y,Z),(U,V) the same argument used above for excluding m− = m+, and repeating the
same calculations, it follows that CUC applies, implying U <T V, hence indeed U ÂT V in
view of the general hypothesis of Case II we are considering now. On the other hand, consider
















hT(V) − hT(U0)=q,a n dhT(U0)=hT(U). Hence, by the same argument as above, CUC applies
and implies V <T U0(in fact, V ÂT U0). Moreover,
gT(U0)=gT(V)+p>g T(V) − r = gT(U).
Thus, by CD, U0 ÂT U whence by transitivity V ÂT U ,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
If p>rand q<sthen m− > r
q >m +.
In this case, take Y,Z,Y




























hT(V) − hT(U0)=q, hT(U0)=hT(U), gT(U) − gT(V0)=r,a n dgT(V0)=gT(V). Then, by
repeating the previous arguments, we have V ÂT U0 and U ÂT V0 by CUC; moreover, gT(U0) −
gT(V)=p, whence gT(U0)=gT(V)+p =( gT(U) − r)+p>g T(U), hence, by CD, U0 ÂT U,
and thus V ÂT U by transitivity. On the other hand, hT(V0) − hT(U)=s, hence hT(V0)=
hT(U)+s =( hT(V) − q)+s>h T(V):t h u s ,b yC D ,V0 ÂT V, hence, by transitivity, U ÂT V,a
contradiction again.












= m+.POVERTY RANKINGS OF OPPORTUNITY PROFILES 23
By deﬁnition of m− and m+, and CUC, Z ÂT Y and Y ÂT Z0, hence by transitivity Z ÂT Z0.
Notice that
hT(Z) − hT(Z0)=hT(Z) − hT(Y)+hT(Y) − hT(Z0)=q − s>0,a n d
gT(Z0) − gT(Z)=gT(Z0) − gT(Y)+gT(Y) − gT(Z)=−r + p>0,
















q · p − q · r
q · p − p · s
).
Since, by deﬁnition, p·s>q ·r, it follows that (
q·p−q·r










q = m−. Thus, since Z0 ∈ NW(Z), it follows, by deﬁnition of m−,t h a tnot Z ÂT Z0,a
contradiction.













Then, by CUC and the deﬁnition of m+ and m−, Y ÂT Z and Z ÂT Z0, hence by transitivity
Y ÂT Z0.














r·s−r·q).N o w ,s i n c e
p
q > r
s, p · s>r· q, whence (
r·s−p·s
r·s−r·q) < 1.T h u s ,
r−p
s−q < r
s = m+ hence by
deﬁnition of m+, notY ÂT Z0, a contradiction again.
Summing up the results obtained under cases i) - iii) a b o v ew em a yc o n c l u d et h a tm− >m + is
also impossible.
Therefore, since we have already shown that m− 6= m+, it follows that m− <m +.
Now, take any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, such that Z ∈ NW(Y),a n d
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) ≤ m−. Then,
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) <m +, whence, by deﬁnition, not Z ÂT Y. On the other hand, (hT(Y),g T(Y)) 6=
(hT(Z),g T(Z)), hence, by assumption, Y ¿T Z.S i n c e <T is a total preorder, it follows that




hT(Y)−hT(Z) >m −, whence, by deﬁnition, not Y ÂT Z. On the other hand, (hT(Y),g T(Y)) 6=
(hT(Z),g T(Z)), hence, by assumption, Y ¿T Z.S i n c e <T is a total preorder, it follows that
Z ÂT Y, a contradiction. Therefore, for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N, it cannot be the case that m− <
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) <m +.
But then, take any w1,w 2 ∈ R+\{0} such that m− < w1
w2 <m +. By our previous observations,
for any Y,Z ∈ P[X]N (so in particular for any such Y,Z with Y ∈ NW(Z))e i t h e r
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) ≤








hT(Y)−hT(Z) < (m−)−1 ·m− =1 , i.e. w2 ·(gT(Z)−gT(Y)) <w 1 ·(hT(Y)−hT(Z)), whence, by24 VITO PERAGINE
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deﬁnition, Y Â
w
TZ (with w =( w1,w 2)). Conversely, let Y ÂTZ. Similarly, if m+ ≤
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z),
then, as shown above, Z ÂTY and w2
w1 ·
gT(Z)−gT(Y)
hT(Y)−hT(Z) > (m+)−1·m+ =1 , i.e. w2·(gT(Z)−gT(Y)) >
w1 · (hT(Y) − hT(Z)), whence, by deﬁnition, Z Â
w
TY (with w =( w1,w 2)), and the thesis follows.
(B) As the previous ones, the foregoing characterization of <w
T is tight, as shown by the following
examples:
i) Choose a pair w =( w1,w 2) of real positive weights, and take the following poverty ranking:
Y <
w(1)
T Z if and only if Y Â
w
TZ or (Y ∼
w
TZ , {Y1,...,Yn,Z 1,...,Zn} * {T,∅} and #(Y1 ∩ T) ≤
#(Z1 ∩ T)). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁes IIO, Q-IBED, CD, NC and CUC but
fails to satisfy AN.
ii) Choose a pair w =( w1,w 2) of real positive weights, and consider the following reﬁnement
of the corresponding w-weighted poverty ranking: Y <
w(2)
T Z if and only if Y Â
w




i∈N #(Yi r T) ≥
P
i∈N #(Zi r T)). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁes AN, DEP,
Q - I B E D ,C Da n dC U Cb u tf a i l st os a t i s f yI I O .
iii) Consider again the following poverty ranking: Y <
hg3




i∈N,Zi+T #(Zi ∩ T). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,Q - I B E D ,C Da n d
CUC but fails to satisfy DEP.
iv) Choose x∗ ∈ T and a pair w =( w1,w 2) of real positive weights, and consider the following
reﬁnement of the corresponding w- weighted poverty ranking: Y <
w4





TZ and either [x∗ ∈ (Yi∗ ∩ Zj∗)] or [x∗ / ∈ Yi∗],w h e r ei∗ =m i n {i ∈ N : Yi + T} and j∗ =
min{i ∈ N : Zi + T}). That ranking is a total preorder that satisﬁe sA N ,I I O ,D E P ,C Da n dC U C
but fails to satisfy Q-IBED.
v) Choose a pair w =( w1,w 2) of real positive weights, and consider again the following poverty
ranking: Y <
gh5
T Z if and only if either [{Yi,Z i} ⊆ {T,∅} for each i ∈ N ] or [there exists i ∈ N such
that Zi / ∈ {T,∅}].I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t<
gh5
T is indeed a total preorder: moreover, it satisﬁes AN,





T ): clearly both of them are poverty rankings, total preorders, and do
satisfy AN, IIO, DEP, Q-IBED and CD,while violating CUC. ¤
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